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THE CASE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE SANCTIONS
RICHARD W. PARKER!
I. INTRODUCTION
Having grown up as the son of a preacher, only to wander away from the
church, I suppose it is my everlasting curse to play the role of devil's advocate.
In any case, that is certainly my role here today. For I am here to champion a
particularly unpopular, if not unholy, cause. I am here to make the case for
allowing, and using, unilateral economic sanctions in support of efforts to
conserve the global commons. By "unilateral," I mean sanctions that are not
specifically required or authorized by some prior multilateral agreement.
Such an undertaking may not appear particularly unholy to the lay observer.
But initiates know that unilateral sanctions are virtually anathema to the high
priesthood of free trade and international law. Indeed, if you ask almost any free
trader, international lawyer, international policy-maker, or senior academic what
he or she thinks of the use of trade sanctions to protect the international
environment, the answer you get will be confident and categorical. They will say
that it may be acceptable for multilateral environmental agreements (M:EAs) to
authorize trade restrictions against parties to those agreements. It may even be
permissible for a few very broadly subscribed treaties-like the Montreal
Protocol-to authorize measures against non-parties (though this is more
troubling). But any other sort of trade restrictions are "unilateral" measures
which should not be practiced or permitted.
Why not? At this point the conversation typically turns conjectural. Unilateral
sanctions are objectionable because they may not be necessary. They may be
used to bully and coerce. They may displace cooperative approaches. They may
be abused. And because all these propositions may be true then it follows that
unilateral environmental trade sanctions must be wrong, must be illegitimate, and
must, of course, be General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) illegal.'
We are told that cooperation is the way to go, not coercion. But if you ask this
same person about the actual experience with unilateral environmental trade
measures (ETMs), that is, have ETMs as applied actually fulfilled all these dire
prophecies, you are likely to get either a blank stare, an anecdote, or, more likely,
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well-intentioned misinformation. Nowhere is this information gap more
apparent than in the committees that need the information most. Though the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Committee on Trade and Environment
(CTE) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Trade and Environment Joint Experts Group have been debating law
and policy on ETMs for upwards of seven years, they have yet to commission or
examine a single (in-depth) empirical study of the role that ETMs have actually
played in the cases where they have been used.
Nor frankly are things much better in scholarly circles. While the mountain
of legal scholarship on trade and environment grows higher every day, the
number of thorough, empirical analyses of ETMs can still be counted on the
fingers of one hand. And the analyses that exist do not support-indeed, they
refute-the stereotypes about ETMs that now dominate both the literature and
policy-makers' discussions of the subject.
Against this background, I would like to do two things today. First, I would
like to encourage students and fellow scholars alike to consider the joys and
responsibilities of field work in the law. There is nothing more satisfying or
illuminating, in my opinion, than getting out there and talking to real people who
are making, implementing and living with the consequences of the law.
Moreover, the intrinsic interest pales beside the importance of the enterprise.
You simply cannot comprehend the operation of the law, particularly in the
international field, by reading treaties and declarations in the comfort of your
armchair. If you are going to offer prescriptions for legal change you have to
understand, and be able to predict, how things will work in practice, which
requires an understanding of past experience.
Second, having made this pitch for empiricism in law, I will now offer a few
of the fruits of it. In particular, I will look at how ETMs have actually worked
in practice, based upon my two-year study of the actual use (and misuse) of
sanctions in the Tuna-Dolphin controversy' and a review of the literature on
other cases. I will then offer an empirical and practical perspective on what
WTO law and doctrine on ETMs should be.
II. THE ROLE OF LEVERAGE IN THE TUNA-DOLPHIN REGIME
The key facts of the Tuna-Do hin Case are these.3 Tuna swim with dolphin in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific. Fishermen found they could use speedboats and
helicopters to spot the dolphins on the surface, herd them into a ball, and
encircle them with a net. Through all this, miraculously, the tuna will stay
beneath the dolphins. Dolphins are thus a fabulous fish finding and catching
device in this type of fishery. Moreover, they lead fishers to only the largest and
2. Richard W. Parker, The Use andAbxae of Trade LiAeMt to Protect the Global Commons: What
We Can Learnfrom the Tuna-Doohin Confdct, 12 GEo. INT'L ENVn. L Rnv. 1, (1999).
3. MeLat 11-56.
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best tuna, for it is only the largest tuna that swim with dolphins. The only
problem is that when fishers haul in the net, they kill all the dolphins-unless a
way can be found to release them without losing the tuna. This caused concern
among dolphin lovers and environmentalists alike.
Dolphin lovers objected to any killing or harassing of dolphins on aesthetic
and moral grounds. Conservationists were concerned that dolphins-being
mammals-have a much lower reproduction rate than fish, and practices that
worked well at catching tuna might be wiping out the whole population of
dolphins. Political pressure developed in the United States to end this practice,
or at least to find a way to greatly reduce dolphin mortality. This pressure
resulted in the Marine Mammal Protection Act,4 which required the U.S. National
Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS) to regulate the dolphin mortality of the U.S.
fleet, seek an international conservation agreement, and place an embargo on
tuna caught with methods that caused mortality of dolphins in excess of U.S.
standards.'
These events happened in 1972. In the years that followed, the NMFS, under
court order, conscientiously regulated the U.S. fleet. Devices and techniques
were developed to release the majority of the encircled dolphins most of the time,
though mortality remained substantial. The U.S. also developed a dolphin
conservation program in the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC). This program involved both research into perfecting dolphin release
techniques and a series of skipper workshops to disseminate these techniques
among the foreign fleet.
However, the participation of the foreign fleet was limited. Fishers were still
finding dolphins. They sawno short-term economic incentive to conserve. They
had no assurance that if they conserved, others would do the same. By the late
1980s, the foreign fleet dominated the fishery. Dolphin mortality rates were
much higher than reproduction rates, and the number of dolphins were declining.
Meanwhile, the NMFS simply issued, year after year, sham certifications that
foreign dolphin conservation programs and mortality levels were comparable to
those of the U.S. fleet-even though everyone knew that they were not.
The one good thing that happened during this period was that the foreign flag
states agreed to require their fleets to accept international observer coverage on
tunaboats. They did this, the record shows, to avoid trade sanctions. In 1986,
the NMFS, under intense congressional pressure, issued a draft rule that
threatened to embargo tuna from any country that refused to accept observers.
Once aboard, however, the observers documented a massive dolphin slaughter
thatwas beyond anyone's prior expectations,including the fishermen themselves.
In 1988, Sam LeBudde, an animal rights activist posing as a cook, shipped out
on a Panamanian tuna boat, bringing home video images of a massive dolphin
slaughter. The gruesome spectacle aired on nationwide TV, with a special
4. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972,16 U.S.C. S 1361 (1994).
5. id
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showing for a key Senate committee. With all eyes focused on the foreign fleet,
Congress amended the law to eliminate all NMFS discretion. Henceforth, the
NMFS would have to certify, on the basis of observer data, that the mortality rate
of each foreign fleet was no greater than 1.25 times that of the U.S. rate or else
the United States would embargo the imports of purse-seine caught yellowfin
tuna from that country.
Frenetic efforts to reduce mortality ensued. However, it was too little, too
late. The NMFS tried to cover for the foreign fleet with bogus certifications.
This time the U.S. court found clear law to apply. The result, in the spring of
1991, was a court-ordered embargo on imports of purse-seine caught yellowfin
tuna from the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). A few months later, the
U.S. imposed a court-ordered secondary embargo on four tuna importing and
exporting countries that were unwilling to cooperate with the primary embargo.
The rest is trade and environment history. Two consecutive dispute panels
ruled that the U.S. embargoes violated the GATT.6 The U.S. refused to adopt
these reports or follow the panel's recommendations. Free traders attacked the
U.S. embargoes as GAT'-illegal. Environmentalists declared that these decisions
proved that GATT was not concerned with the needs of environmental
protection. There the debate deadlocked, at such a level of intensity, that few
have noticed that what happened in the field, in the shadows of the embargoes,
was the quiet emergence of one of the most innovative and effective
environmental regimes in the world.
In 1992, the IAITC established a Dolphin Conservation Program that
established a declining schedule of dolphin mortality rates for every vessel that
sets nets on dolphins. It required an international observer on every vessel. It
established an international review panel comprised of government, industry and
environmental representatives who are charged with receiving observer reports,
determining infractions, and recommending sanctions. Most of all, the program
gained the participation of every country and vessel in the region.
The results are nothing less than remarkable. Dolphin mortality has fallen
from 130,000 in 1986 to around 3,000 per year since 1994. Participation is 100
percent. Compliance is nearly 100 percent. Fishers' catch and profits remain
high. Fishers and flag-states take real pride in their conservation
accomplishments. One would be hard pressed to find another environmental
regime anywhere that produced such a quick and dramatic turnaround.
There is one fly in the ointment, and it is a major fly. The countries still face
a massive trade restriction in the U.S. market! This is not because of the
embargoes, which were lifted in 1997 (five years after the program was born).
The trade restrictions arise from a coordinated U.S. cannery and distributor
boycott that was put in place in 1991 and remains in effect today. This boycott
applies to all tuna caught by encircling dolphins at all, even if all the dolphins are
6. GAIT 1947, tra note 1; ThE RESULs OFTHE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTs 423 (1999) [hereinafter LEGAL TEXT].
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released unharmed. That is the legal definition of the "dolphin-safe" logo that
you see on tunafish cans: no dolphin encirdement-peiod.
This circumstance presents two major ironies. The first is that dolphin-safe
fishing may be good for dolphins, but it is horrible for eco-systems. Whereas
dolphin encirclement targets large adult tuna, the alternatives to dolphin
encirclement kill huge numbers of juvenile tuna, non-target-species, and even
some endangered species like sea turtles. That is why Greenpeace and several
other major environmental groups no longer support an immediate transition to
dolphin-safe. It also explains why foreign fleets and flag states are bitterly
resentful of the "dolphin safe" consumer boycott.
The secondirony pertains to the trade regime. The GATT rejected embargoes
which produced one of the most effective environmental regimes in the world,
but upheld the "voluntary" cannery boycott which is far more trade restrictive
and makes no environmental sense.
That is the Tuna-Dolphin story in a nutshell. What can we learn from it?' Let
me explore that question by considering what the experience tells us about three
leading"free trade" criticisms of environmental sanctions: (1) unilateral ETMs are
unnecessary and/or ineffective; (2) ETMs are coercive; (3) ETMs are prone to
abuse. I will show that the empirical record squarely refutes the first two
propositions but confirms the third.
III. ARE ETMS NECESSARY AND EFFECTIVE?
"Necessary" is a difficult word. It requires you to imagine every conceivable
alternative way of getting to a result and conclude that none of them would have
worked. I am not sure that anything can ever be proven to be "necessary" in the
strictly logical sense of that word.
However, my research demonstrates conclusively that the threat of trade
leverage was crucial in getting a dolphin conservation program started in the
IATTC, getting observers on board tuna vessels, getting skippers and owners
participating in IATTC dolphin mortality reduction workshops, mobilizing
conservation interests, pressures, and environmental agencies in foreign states.
The threat of trade leverage was also crucial in producing a real dialogue between
fishers and conservationists in the IATTC, in the formation and successful
implementation of the 1992 Dolphin Conservation Agreement, as well as its 1997
successor agreement. For 16 years, the U.S. did not apply trade leverage and
nothing happened. Then came the embargoes, yielding rapid progress.
Tuna-Dolphin controversy is not unique. Other scholars have documented
the key role that threats of unilateral trade restrictions played in the formation
and implementation of the stratospheric ozone treaty, the ocean dumping
convention, the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), the International Whaling Commission, the
high-seas driftnet ban, and certain regional fisheries regimes. Indeed, behind
almost any strong, truly effective, international environmental agreement (lEA)
2001]
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in the world today and you are likely to find-at some key juncture in its past or
present-the credible threat of unilateral or small group economic leverage.
Perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the necessity of leverage lies in an
examination of the fate of fisheries regimes that have tried to make changes
without using trade leverage. They often have found themselves bereft of
resources and authority, unable to enforce decisions against holdouts by any
means short of physical coercion (as Canada was forced to do with respect to a
Spanish trawler recently). To be sure, not all international ocean regimes require
the aid of leverage. The counter-examples, however, tending to be straddling
stock regimes where coastal state Coast Guards can apply physical muscle in
waters adjacent to their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), or regional fishing
agreements among like-minded states already linked by a dose sense of
community and deep ties across a range of issues-such as the Pacific Halibut
Commission.
The record demonstrates a further important point about the role of trade
leverage in conserving the commons. It is that old habits die hard. New habits
are not easily formed. Producers are reluctant to change the way they do
business, and governments are reluctant to adopt new rules and then build new
programs or institutions to enforce them. Moreover, no one can be sure, at first,
that their conservation efforts will be matched by others. Conversely, once new
technology is purchased, new practices adopted, and new enforcement programs
are created, the compliance of competitors is proven. The advantage of inertia
shifts to favor the new status quo-the status quo of a new, sustainable practice.
This means that trade leverage is most needed precisely in the situation where it
is now kast accepted in the trade community-at the regime formation stage,
where uncertainties are highest and the forces of inertia favor an unsustainable
status quo.
These clear conclusions come, however, with a vitally important qualification.
Trade leverage may often be necessary, but it is almost never sufficient. History
makes dear that the effectiveness of leverage depends on the concurrent
deployment of all sorts of other instruments of diplomacy encompassed in the
so-called "managerial model"--research, training, financial assistance, capacity
building, technology transfer, monitoring, reporting, issue-linkage, discourse, peer
pressure. Leverage can empower management, but cannot substitute for it.
IV. IS ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE LEVERAGE COERCION?
Free traders love to refer to environmental trade measures as "coercion" or
"bullying," of which everyone, of course, disapproves. In fact, there is no
instance in recorded history in which environmental trade leverage has actually
been deployed with anything even remotely resembling a coercive effect.
Certainly, there has not been physical coercion. Nor has there been economic
coercion in the sense of depriving target states or industries of economically
lucrative alternatives to compliance. Tuna kept out of the U.S. market found
[Vol. 7:21
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profitable markets in Latin America and/or Europe. Shrimp embargoed by the
United States could easily be sold in Asia, Latin America or Europe. "Pelly
Amendment" sanctions connected to whaling or fisheries conservation violations
have not come close to bringing any foreign industry to its knees. ETMs in
practice have been very limited in scope.
One reason free traders are so easily lead to the conclusion that ETMs are
coercive is because they have not looked very closely, or thought very deeply,
about how ETMs work. The assumption is that sanctions or threatened sanctions
work, if at all, by making target states and fishers do what they do not want to do,
which looks like coercion. The reality is more complex. ETMs do impose or
threaten significant (though not ruinous) costs. But my research shows that the
primary function and effect of sanctions is indirect Itis cognitive and discursive.
In the Tuna-Dolphin Case, the threat of sanctions got observers on to tuna
boats. These observers produced data which revealed that dolphin mortality was
much higher than previously thought. The observer data thus showed that the
issue at stake is not the cuteness of dolphins but the preservation of ecosystems.
The observer data also revealed close correlations between certain fishing
practices and high (or low) levels of dolphin mortality. These correlations
suggested that dolphin mortality was not an uncontrollable happenstance as
fishermen had previously assumed. Mortality could be reduced to very low levels
through the use of proper gear and practice. That discovery revolutionized the
way the fleet and flag states thought about the costs and benefits of conservation.
It did not make them gung-ho conservationists; but it did dramatically lower their
resistance to conservation.
These cognitive transformations, propelled originally by research, were
reinforced by sustained discourse among fishers, government officials and
IA'-TC staffin workshops, seminars, meetings of the IATC, and inter-sessional
talks. Fishers grew more sensitive to conservation concerns, while
environmentalists gained a healthy realism about the economic and
environmental costs of purist "dolphin-safe" policies.
Research and discourse thus wins much of the credit for the successful accord
that followed. But the record is clear that it was U.S. sanctions and threats of
sanctions that made dolphin conservation front page news in target states, and
it was sanction threats that energized the discourse that ensued.
In sum, ETMs as applied to date have not been "coercive" in the sense of
threatening foreign states orproducers with bankruptcy or even with sustained
and serious loss of revenues. They have succeeded without coercion.
Suppose, now, the facts were otherwise and the U.S. hadwielded its enormous
trade leverage to threaten target industries with real economic harm. Would this
be unconscionable? Before one condemns "coercive" ETMs, one should
consider the alternative: the destruction of the commons by holdouts who refuse
to cooperate with any effective agreement In such a case it is the conservationist
countries who are coerced in a much stronger sense. The conservationist
2001]
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countries are forced to stand by and watch the global commons being plundered
against their will.
V. ARE ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE SANCTIONS PRONE TO ABUSE?
Free traders worry that environmental trade sanctions will be abused in one
of three ways. The first form of abuse is disguised protectionism. The second
involves the application of trade pressure in support of goals that are
environmentally arbitrary or idiosyncratic. The third form of abuse occurs when a
sanctioning country uses bilateral economic pressure to dip/ace multilateral
cooperation or to impose unfair terms of cooperation.
The tuna-dolphin experience illustrates allthe concerns. The decision of the
U.S. Congress to compel foreign fishers to match the performance of the U.S.
fleet in the same year, or else be embargoed, was blatantly protectionist in effect,
if not in intent. The foreign fleet had no way of even knowing the standards it had
to meet until it was too late to do anything about it. The U.S. fleet, by contrast,
always met the standards because its performance was the standard.
In addition, the U.S. standard was environmentally arbitrary. On its face, the
actual rate of dolphin mortality by the U.S. fleet bears no relation to the
sustainable level of mortality for given dolphin stocks. Moreover, in 1992,
Congress amended the law so as to embargo imports of ETP yellowfin tuna
unless the countries followed the U.S. standard in requiring exclusively dolphin-
safe fishing (i.e. fishing with no encirclement of dolphins).' This, again, was a
requirement that U.S. and foreign fishers felt was environmentally irrational and
economically ruinous in that fishery.
The Tuna-Doohin Case also illustrates a third abuse scenario-in which
economic pressure displaces or undermines cooperative management Indeed,
the dolphin-safe label and boycott, which effectively ensured that even tuna
caughtin full conformity with IATTC standards could not enter the U.S. market,
has greatly strained, and may yet destroy, the IA ITC dolphin regime.
The Tuna-Dolphin controversy may illustrate the dangers ofabuse, but abuses
are not confined to tuna-dolphin fishing. Similar misuses of environmental trade
leverage have been documented in the Reformulated Gas Case, the Canadian
Pacific salmon and herring export ban, and in the shrimp-turde controversy. The
danger of abuse appears to be generic.
VI. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
We are left with an instrument that, in the environmental setting, is vitally
necessary, often effective, and prone to abuse. What should the WTO do about
this?
7. International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-523, 106 Stat 3425
(1992) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. S 1361 (1994)).
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In my view, three things should be done. The first and most obvious thing
the WTO should do is consider the empirical evidence and accept the
conclusions that flow from it. For years the WTO has discussed the issue of
sanctions in an empirical vacuum, which has elevated anecdotes, stereotypes, and
ideology over evidence. But we are not writing on a clean slate. ETMs have a
track record that needs to be assessed, carefully and objectively.
The second thing the WTO must do, if there is to be any meaningful
discussion of environmental trade measures in that forum, is to jettison the term
of reference, set forth in the 1994 CTE mandate, which arbitrarily limits
discussion to trade measures taken "pursuant to" a pre-existing agreement. The
evidence, however unpopular, is clear. Trade leverage is needed to get
agreements, not just to enforce them. Unilateral leverage raises special problems
of its own, but that does not justify excluding it out of hand.
The third thing the WTO should do is accept the words and recognize the
wisdom of its own founding charter. Nothing in the text of GATE 1947 or the
WTO Agreement? precludes a sensible, and empirically defensible, law and policy
on ETMs. Article XX of GATT 1947," which was incorporated into the GAIT
1994," quite dearly allows as an exception to GAT disciplines, trade restrictions
"relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources .. .' The preamble
to Article XX limits the scope of that exception in two key respects: ETMs must
not be applied "in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or [be] a disguised restriction on international trade."' 3
The language is prophetic. For we have seen that ETMs are prone to
protectionist abuse, vulnerable to hijacking for the service of (environmentally)
arbitrary goals, and subject to the temptations of unjustifiable peremptoriness.
But if we compare these empirically demonstrated susceptibilities to abuse with
the screening mechanism contained in the preamble to Article XX, a striking fact
emerges. All that is needed to sort the wheat from the chaff among ETMs is
careful application of the words of the Article XX preamble. The "disguised
protectionist" bar dearly weeds out protectionist abuses, and the "arbitrary and
unjustifiable" restriction covers the other two forms of abuse.
To be sure, the words "arbitrary and unjustifiable" are broad, and their
application requires broad discretion. The exercise of that discretion must be
guided by the needs of the trading system, by the environmental purpose for
8. GATT 1947, s*ra note 1.
9. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], LEGAL TEXTS, sra note 6, at 3.
10. GAIT 1947, .smra note 1, at art. XX.
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15,1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
IA, LEGAL TXT, smpra note 6, at 17.
12. GAIT 1947, axpra note 1, at art. XX.
13. Id
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which the exception is invoked, and by the commitment to "sustainable
development" that now appears in the WTO's charter. But deciding the
substantiality of the nexus between an ETM and a legitimate environmental
purpose requires knowledge, experience and judgement in matters of
environmental law and policy. WTO panels and judges are empowered to call on
experts to help them make this determination. But, in practice, generalist lay
judges have not compiled a particularly stellar record of umpiring "battles of
experts" whether in the WTO or in domestic courts. Given that the planet's
oceans and skies are at stake, environmentalists are quite right, in my view, to
insist that the "judges" themselves be experts, and empower them to make their
own investigation of the bona fides of ETMs in particular cases.
In sum, what is required for a sensible, empirically valid WTO law of trade and
environment is not primarily new law within the WTO, but a new institution
outside ofit. Until such a body exists, we can expect that the WTO will continue
to lack credibility in deciding ETM cases.
Meanwhile, ETMs will no doubt continue to be used. But their use will be
rare and their effectiveness impaired by the fact that ETMs continue to be
regarded in the world community as reprehensible, belligerent acts with no
redeeming social value. It is this stigma, more than anything else, which renders
administrations reluctant to impose sanctions in practice. This stigma renders
other countries unwilling to cooperate with sanctions that are imposed. It is this
stigma which has prevented the tuna-dolphin program and any number of other
high seas fisheries management regimes from authorizing the use of sanctions,
even when circumstances make it plainly, often painfully, dear that their mission
vitally requires the support of leverage.
This realization takes us full circle. For cleansing the stigma that has attached
to environmental trade measures, in the United States and abroad, will require a
broader understanding that environmental sanctions, whether multilateral or
unilateral, are often necessary and effective in protecting the global commons,
even if they are prone to abuse.
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